I strongly doubt the bioweapon hypothesis of SARS-Cov-2's origin. I do not see that it would be of benefit to the Chinese state for a virus to have the characteristics of this virus, and I am sceptical of the idea that these characteristics can be easily engineered without repeated testing on large samples of human subjects.
However, the accidental release hypothesis is not so easily discounted. The close proximity of where the virus outbreak was first discovered and China's premier virology lab is quite a coincidence. China is not a free and open society, and the totalitarian state employs lies and secrecy in all matters. Its official refutations of an accidental leak mean very little, because we would expect the same from it if true, and it is unlikely that the Chinese will let an independent international investigation occur within their country.
Accidental lab releases of biological pathogens have happened before, even in the West, and in some cases have lead to quite extensive and damaging epidemics.
I remember in the summer of 2007 that there was an outbreak of bovine foot and mouth disease in the south of England. I took a holiday to the West Country that year, and there were requirements to socially-distance from cows at that time, and stations to wash one's shoes provided at many farmers' fields with public rights of way.
The outbreak is thought to have originated due to the discharge of effluent in the drainage system of the Pirbright Institute in Surrey (allegedly a 'category 4' laboratory). This caused a significant international response as well, with requirements for many travellers from the United Kingdom to have their shoes disinfected upon arrival in other countries (the threat was taken a lot more seriously than in the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic), and temporary bans on imports of British beef and pork products.
2007 United Kingdom foot-and-mouth outbreak - Wikipedia
In 1977, there was a 'Russian flu' pandemic, which likely originated in China. This strain was the same as one that had not been seen since twenty years earlier, and which mostly affected young people when it came around again in '77. This is because older people had an immunity from the earlier pandemic. It is thought that the likely way that it could have appeared again is due to an accidental release from a laboratory in China (or Russia) as part of undeclared vaccine research. Given that the Wuhan laboratory has existed since 1956, and there were very few such facilities in China at the time, it may even have come from there.
A Dead Disease Still Lives in Lab Freezers. What Else Does?
In 1978, officially post-eradication, an accidental release of smallpox infected a medical photographer working above a laboratory at the University of Birmingham Medical School (in Britain again) where the virus was being studied. She died of the disease, and infected her father, who also died. This could easily have led to a large-scale outbreak of smallpox, but for sheer good fortune.
1978 smallpox outbreak in the United Kingdom - Wikipedia
In 1979, a maintenance error with a ventilation system at a Soviet military laboratory lead to the accidental release of weaponized anthrax which infected, and killed, a hundred or so workers at a nearby ceramics factory in the closed Soviet city of Sverdlovsk. This was embarrassing to the Soviet state because they had claimed to have destroyed their stockpile of biological weapons in response to a treaty agreement ratified in 1975.
Sverdlovsk anthrax leak - Wikipedia
The 2001 anthrax attacks in the US involved the deliberate use of anthrax from a US military biodefence laboratory by a researcher.
2001 anthrax attacks - Wikipedia
So this sort of thing has happened, and likely will happen again. Some researchers consider the threat of pandemic infection from laboratories to be an equal or even greater threat to that from nature.